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THE VALIDITY OF VOID DIVORCES
FOWLER VINCENT HARPER
INTRODUCTION

It is old learning that a decree of divorce, like any other
judicial action, must have been rendered by a court which had
jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter. After some
competition in the common law as to the proper doctrine in determining requisites for jurisdiction of subject matter,' it turned out
that domicile was adopted as the point of reference for such questions. This, of course, caused no end of difficulty as soon as the
law developed the capacity of spouses to have separate domiciles. 2
These difficulties are being reasonably well ironed out, in theory
at least, so that the rules for jurisdiction in divorce matters can
be predicted with some degree of accuracy. Briefly stated, it
3
appears that: (I) the domicile of both parties can divorce them;
(2) a state where neither party is domiciled cannot divorce them;4
(3) the domicile of one party 5 has jurisdiction to divorce where
the absent spouse appears, or consents to or affords cause for the
separate domicile; 6 (4) possibly, in New York at least, the place
39 HARV. L. REV. 417, 424.
Beale, ConstitutionalProtection of Divorce Decrees (19o6) 19 HAgv. L.
REV. 586.
'Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926)

a CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 193o)

§ 117 (Hereafter

cited4 "Restatement").

RESTATEIENT, § 118.

'Frequently, by statute, the plaintiff. See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1927) 291 n. 24. Such requirements, as to length of residence, are often not
treated as jurisdictional. See RESTATEMENT, § 117, comment (b).
RESTATEMENT, § 119. See Beale, op. cit. supra note I, at 426. These are the

only situations in which the domicile of one party alone has jurisdiction for divorce proceedings. This is the position of the American Law Institute and it is,
in substance, Professor Beale's doctrine. It is to be admitted that it is not free
from doubt so far as the cases are concerned. There are important dicta to the
effect that a state which is the domicile of the husband only can divorce him
even though that domicile were not obtained under the above circumstances,
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525 (19o6) ; and there are
eminent critics who refuse to follow Professor Beale to this length in defiance
of such dicta (See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 5, 293 et seq.).
The position o f the RESTATEMENT is adopted here as an authoritative and
correct statement of the law, because: (I) there are no decided cases squarely
against it; (2) it is a highly desirable doctrine and avoids many of the anomalous and absurd results of a different rule (See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note
5, 297, n. 35) ; (3) it is the logical and reasonable position for the Supreme
(158)
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where the parties have lived for an extended time as man and wife
has jurisdiction to divorce.7 Jurisdiction of the person is acquired
by personal service within the state, or, within limits set by the
Federal Constitution, through service by publication upon absent
residents where authorized by appropriate statutes.
Problems raised by bringing in question a foreign divorce are
generally solved by ordinary common law principles governing
collateral attack together with the application of the above rules.
But sometimes these rules prove inadequate to do justice between
the parties or fail adequately to protect the social interest in the
security of the domestic relation; and where the result would be
particularly offensive to ordinary canons of decency, courts will
seek to avoid the rules. A substantial body of law has grown up
out of these efforts which materially supplements the generalizations listed above. Thus, although a divorce be rendered by a
court which was the domicile of neither party, or of one party
only, or which did not have jurisdiction of the defendant, nevertheless it may be accorded some effect, if to deny it any efficacy
whatever would defeat the ends of justice. These cases proceed
on different and varying grounds and many of them, though satisfactory in the main as to result, are confusing in the rationalization adopted and in the anomalous attempts at doctrinal development which have accompanied them. The questions arise in
various ways: as in a subsequent annulment or divorce action
between the parties, in a criminal prosecution for bigamy, in proceedings in probate for letters of administration, in bills for a
widow's allowance, in petitions for admeasurement of dower or
partition, in actions for alienation of affections, and in actions of
ejectment or specific performance between grantees and heirs of
the principals to the divorce action. Since domicile is the dominant conception of the orthodox Conflict of Laws rules, the cases
will be grouped according to the domiciliary situation involved.
Court to take under the
clause, and involves no
ruling of decided cases;
may acquire a separate

Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit
serious reversal of its present position and no over(4) when the lav develops to the point where a wife
domicile under any and all circumstances, the unde-

sirable social situations where the parties are single in one state and married in
another will be doubled if the above stated rule is not correct.
7Gould v. Gould, 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (923).
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DIVORCE AT DOMICILE OF BOTH PARTIES

Same Forum
No Conflict of Laws question is raised where a divorce decree
is questioned in the jurisdiction where it was rendered. Neither
is there any question of jurisdiction of subject matter in the common law or Conflict of Laws sense. But since the cases and annotations do not always recognize the distinction between this situation and the one present when the decree is questioned in another
state, and for the further reason that the principles involved,
though sometimes the same, frequently differ, consideration is
taken of the problem thus raised. A distinction must be drawn
between a direct attack upon the divorce to vacate the same, and
a collateral attack.
Principles upon which a court of equity will act to vacate a
divorce decree are not fundamentally different from those applying
to relief against any judgment.

If there is a statute regulating

the proceeding, it will, of course, govern. Usually divorce decrees
may be attacked directly when they are voidable for fraud, at the
instance of the one defrauded. Success in vacating a divorce
depends upon equitable principles; 8 if the party seeking to vacate
the decree was the one who practiced the fraud, he, of course,
cannot impeach it.9 If he was in any way a party to the fraud,
he is in no better position. 1° Thus divorces obtained by collusion
between the parties or with the consent of the defendant are
immune to direct attack in equity or under a statute. The parties
are in pari delicto and equity will aid neither. 1 It is thought that
the dignity of the court, imposed upon by the parties, must be protected, and this, together with the principle that the parties are in
no position to seek the aid of a court to relieve them from their
own wrong, furnishes the grounds for most decisions. This rule
'But if the decree was void, as for want of jurisdiction of the particular
court, it seems that it may be directly attacked by either party regardless of
the "equities" between them. See Davidson v. Ream, 178 App. Div. 362, 164
N~. Y. Snpp. 1037 (1917).

' See Rindge v. Rindge, 22 Ind. 31 (1864).
"Robinson v. Robinson, 77 Wash. 663, 138 Pac. 288 (1914).
' For vacation at the application of both parties, see Colvin v. Colvin, 2
Paige 385 (N. Y. 1831) and note 6o L. R. A. 296 (19o3)..
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is applied where an agreement or promise is made by one spouse
by which the other is induced to offer no defense to the action.
After the unfortunate spouse has failed to realize the consideration
for the "shameless bargain", he (or, as is more usual, she) cannot
attack the decree. 12 The doctrine is firmly imbedded in the law
and the cases frequently quote Willes, C. J., in Pruden v. Phillips, 3 that "if both parties collude in the cheat upon the court, it
was never known that either of them could vacate the judgment".
In these cases it makes no difference whether the party seeking to
avoid the decree was the one who procured the divorce or not.
Both are equally without equity.
Sometimes there are additional reasons for denying relief, as
where one of the parties remarries. As one court 14 said:
"But when the vacation of a decree of divorce, obtained by
collusion, is sought by a willing participant in the fraud, the
court, on the principle of the maxim, 'Ex dolo malo non
oritur actio', will refuse to disturb the decree, especially when
and children have sprung
the opposing party has remarried,
1
from the second union". 5
This applies equally where the one who obtained the decree remarries

10

or where the other party remarries;'-, and whether it

is the party attacking the decree "I or the adverse party who has
remarried."9
I Hubbard v. Hubbard, 19 Colo. 13, 34 Pac. 170 (1893) ; Simmons v. Sim-

mons, 47 Mich. 253, io N. W. 36o (1881) ; Orth v. Orth, 69 Mich. 158, 37 N. W.

67 (1888).

"See note to Duchess of Kingston's Case (1776). The case is reported in
TRIALS (1781) 198, from a note by Ford.
Karren v. Karren, 25 Utah 87, 93, 69 Pac. 465, 467 (19o2).
Plaintiff had agreed to permit her husband to divorce her to enable him
to obtain certain property from his father. The husband promised to remarry
plaintiff, after he had obtained the property. Instead he got the deed to the
property and promptly married someone else.
HARGRAVE, STATE

'

Karren v. Karren, supra note 14.
Sedlack v. Sedlack, 14 Ore. 540, 13 Pac. 452 (1887).

Stephens v. Stephens, 51 Ind. 542 (1875) (pending appeal from divorce
decree, appellant remarried. Appeal dismissed).
v. Earle, 91 Ind. 27 (1883) (plaintiff attacked decree for fraud
'Earle
after lapse of several years and after defendant had married again). Cf.
Kantor v. Cohen, 181 App. Div. 400, 168 N. Y. Supp. 846 (1918) (where both
parties remarried after a church divorce).
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But if the collusion or consent on the part of the defendant
in the divorce action is not real so that from the point of view of
the equity court the parties are not in pari delicto, the result may
be different. 20 So also in cases where the decree was obtained in
the name of the wife, by the husband, without her knowledge or
consent. 2 ' Sometimes, however, vacation will be denied on the
mere ground of laches, as where years have been allowed to elapse
after the decree. The delay and lapse of time may be regarded as
a constructive consent or consent by acquiescence. 22 The same
result may also be reached where the "object of the attack is obvi23
ously merely alimony" and no genuine merit is disclosed.
A Conflict of Laws question may be raised where a vacation
of the divorce is pleaded in another jurisdiction. Generally, such
a decree is governed by ordinary considerations of jurisdiction of
the person and subject matter. If the personal rights of one not
a party to the action to vacate are involved, the vacating decree
may be denied any effect on such rights in other states, 24 whether
' Cobb v. Cobb, 43 S. D. 388, 179 N. W. 498 (1920) (where the wife was
not prevented from vacating a decree of absolute divorce in which no alimony
had been allowed, although she had procured the divorce. The husband had
misrepresented to her that his life was endangered because he continued to live
with her).

Cf. Karren v. Karren, supra notes 14, 15.

Although Daniels v. Benedict, 5o Fed. 347 (C. C. D. Col. 1892) was not a
direct attack, as it was an action in equity for partition against the trustees of
the deceased husband, the considerations were regarded by the court as the
same. The collateral attack was permitted because the fraud was "extrinsic"
to the matter tried. Cf. Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray 361 (Mass. 1854) where
Chief Justice Shaw treated an action for divorce by a spouse against whom a
former decree had been rendered in the same state, all parties being domiciled
therein, as a direct attack to vacate the original decree. See also Johnson v.
Johnson, 182 Ala. 554, 62 So. 70l (1913) in which an action for dower by a
former wife who had permitted her husband to institute proceedings for divorce
in her name in the same state, was regarded as both a direct and collateral
attack. In the Daniels case, supra, the wife prevailed when it appeared that
although she had consented, for a consideration, to the decree, she was at the
time ill and in need of money for her immediate wants. It was held that she
was not in pari delicto.
"Bradford v. Abend, 89 Ill. 78 (1878).
Zoellmer v. Zoellmer, 46 Mich. 511, 9 N. W. 831 (1881).
'Gans v. Gans, 77 N. J. Eq. 309, 76 Atl. 234 (I9IO) (wife attacked decree
rendered in favor of her husband after she had obtained a "jewish divorce!' on
the strength thereof and after she had prosecuted him for cohabiting with her
out of wedlock; the parties had made up their differences for a while and had
lived together after the divorce).
' Passailaigue v. Herron, 38 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 5th, 193o) (infant son
in Florida held not affected by a Louisiana vacation of a Louisiana decree divorcing his mother from her former husband, so far as the son's rights in Florida
personal property were concerned).
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because of a want of jurisdiction of such third party's rights or
because of public policy is not clear.
Until the decree is attacked by one defrauded or wronged
thereby, it would seem that it is conclusive upon collateral attack.
While some courts have treated a collateral attack where the parties were the same, as in substance direct,2 3 it is more usual to
find courts adhering to the general rule of res adjudicata or estoppel of record. Thus where a wife sued for partition of her
"husband's" lands at his death, it was held that a former divorce
in the same state could not be thus attacked for collusion in a collateral proceeding. 2 6 The same result, of course, would haveensued
in a direct attack because of the wife's participation. The doctrine
of res adjudicata or estoppel of record has been applied in favor
27
of third persons in a somewhat novel manner. In an Iowa case,
where a husband had obtained a divorce in the wife's name, he
was not permitted to deny its validity when pleaded as a defense
in an action for alienation of the affections of his wife. The
court insisted that:
"The general rule that an adjudication is binding as such
only upon the parties to the litigation and their privies may be
taken for granted ....
The difficulty with applying such
rule to a divorce case is that, in the eyes of the law, the parties
to the case are not the only parties in interest in the litigation.
. . . In such a case, the court is dealing with something
more than the private rights of the parties to the case. The
marriage to be dissolved is not a mere contract, but is a status.
In such status, the public interest is involved in a very sensitive way. A decree of divorce dissolves not only the marriage contract, but changes the status of the parties and
thereby their relation to the public as well as to each other.
The binding force of such decree necessarily enters into the
future relations of the parties, not only as between them2
selves, but affects also their relations with third parties". 1
All this, no doubt, is beside the point, but the result seems clearly
correct upon orthodox grounds.
" See

Greene v. Greene and Johnson v. Johnson, both supra note 20.
'Frebe v. Elder, 181 Ind. 597, io5 N. E. 151 (I914).
"Hamilton v. McNeill, 15o Iowa 470, 129 N. W. 480 (I9II).
Ibid. at 477, 129 N. W. at 482.
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A collateral attack, of course, may be made where the
divorce, although decreed in the same state, is void by reason of
a failure of jurisdiction of the court to attach. The rule here is
the same as in other actions where service upon the parties fails or
is insufficient to meet the demands of due process. 29 But it seems
that there may be an estoppel or bar 30 to challenge the decree upon
the same principles which control a collateral attack in another
state, 3 ' and this regardless of whether the want of jurisdiction
went to the subject of the action or to the person. In Marvin v.
Foster 32 the husband deserted his wife and she obtained a divorce
from him in Minnesota, the matrimonial domicile and the domicile
of both parties at the time. The decree, however, was void in
Minnesota 33 for want of proper compliance with the statute governing service of summons. The husband had actual knowledge
of the action but did not appear and later remarried. In an action
brought to share in his first wife's estate at her decease, it was
held that he was barred. The court was moved by the plight of
the second wife:
"He may publish his own shame to the world for a
money consideration; but this court will not aid him to stig'As by an unreasonable and unconstitutional exercise of jurisdiction, as
such term is used in the conflict of laws. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S.
9o, 37 Sup. Ct. 343 (1917). See GooDRicH, op. cit. sapra note 5, 138.
' See Asbury v. Powers, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1622, 65 S. W. 6o5 (1goi).
" Cf. the somewhat analogous situation in Goodwin v. Goodwin, 158 App.
Div. I71, 142 N. Y. Supp. io2 (1923), where the husband was estopped to allege
the invalidity of his marriage in an action to annul it by reason of his having a
limited divorce based upon his affirmation of the validity of the marriage; also
Woodland v. Woodland, [1928] P. 169, where the husband was estopped in a
proceeding of nullity on the grounds that there was no valid marriage, by the
record of a former proceeding instituted by the wife for restitution of conjugal
rights, in which proceeding he had filed no answer and the decree had been entered on a finding that there had been a valid marriage. In fact, the marriage
was invalid because the wife had no valid divorce from a former husband at the
time of the marriage.
3261 Minn. 154, 63 N. W. 484 (1895).

Quere: as to its validity in other states. There is high authority for the
proposition that it is valid elsewhere. Pemberton v. Hughes, [1899] I Ch. 781.
See RESTATEMENT, § 474. It is hard to follow the logic of this doctrine, however. A "judgment" is recognized abroad when it is not recognized as a "judgment" at home. Logical complications are to be found with respect to the full
faith and credit clause. By hypothesis there is a valid judgment in foreign
states, but the Constitution does not compel its recognition. See RESTATEMENT,
§ 474, comment (a). Throughout the following discussion in the text, it is assumed that the doctrine of Pemberton v. Hughes, supra, is not sound.
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matize his second wife as living an adulterous life, nor hold
her child is a bastard." 34
The same result was reached in Arthur v. Israel,^5 although
the second spouse was not entitled to the court's solicitous protection. Here, the wife eloped and lived in adultery with her paramour until after her husband obtained a divorce, whereupon she
married her affinity. The decree was void for defective service,
but the wife was barred from her former husband's estate. The
court would not aid one who "accepts and claims the fruits of a
void judgment". In Mohler v. Shanks,3 6 the divorced and remarried wife of an insane husband could not challenge a
divorce obtained for the insane ward by his guardian although
the same was said to be void, since she had "claimed the fruits"
of the "decree" by her remarriage. Similarly in Bourne v. Simpson, 3T although a divorce against an infant was not binding against

her, her acceptance of property under the decree and her remarriage did bar her from her first husband's estate. Here, however,
the decree was voidable and not void. In Richeson v. Sinions,38 a
legislative divorce, though unconstitutional in Missouri at the
time,3" could not be denied after a lapse of years by the divorced
husband who had remarried in the meantime. In several of these
cases the jurisdictional defect was a want of jurisdiction over the
person, in which event the result may clearly rest upon the doctrine
of estoppel, in the strict sense. Where the defect goes to the
subject matter, the problem is obviously more difficult from a
theoretical viewpoint by reason of the dogma that such jurisdiction cannot be extended or enlarged by act or consent of the
parties. Most of the cases ignore the distinction.
Different Forum
Where the divorce was decreed at the domicile of both parties
there can be no question about jurisdiction of the subject matter
Supra note 32, at 16o, 63 N. W. at 486.
',
15 Colo. 147, 25 Pac. 8i (89o).
93 Iowa 273, 61 N. W. 981 (I895).
"48 Ky. 454 (1849).
"42 Mo. 22 (i87o).
"State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120 (1835).
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and thus a decree can be attacked only on the grounds of want of
jurisdiction of the parties or a want of the jurisdiction of the
particular court which rendered the decree. In either case, the
grounds upon which the decree could be collaterally attacked in a
foreign forum are identical with the ones that would support
such an attack in the state where rendered. 40 Due process as a
guarantee of jurisdiction within common law rules is the same for
all states. The full faith and credit clause rule will compel no
greater recognition abroad than will due process at home.
As to a direct attack, of course, such could be made only in
the state which rendered the decree, and this whether the action is
under a special statute or by a petition to vacate.4 '
DIVORCE AT DOMICILE OF NEITHER PARTY

Where Both PartiesAppear
The accepted doctrine as to divorces obtained in a state which
is the domicile of neither party is, of course, that they are utterly
void for the reason that the court did not have jurisdiction of the
subject matter.4 2 Either party may be prosecuted for bigamy
upon a subsequent remarriage, for his status is unchanged by the
foreign decree.4 3 This is just as true in the jurisdiction in which
the decree was rendered as it is in foreign states,4 4 but where both
parties appear, it is quite generally held that, as between themselves, the decree cannot be questioned. 45 This is true both as to
the party obtaining the foreign decree 46 and the party against
whom the decree was entered, if there was no bona fide defense
upon the merits. 47 To be sure, the domiciliary state is not reoExcept, possibly, in the Pemberton v. Hughes situation, supra note 33.
"1See Miltimore v. Miltimore, 40 Pa. 151 (85).
' GooRIcH, op. cit. supra note 5, 285.
' Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263 (1877); People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247
(1872) ; Van Fessen v. State, 37 Ohio St. 317 (1881).
See De Bouchet v. Candler, 296 Fed. 482 (N. D. Ga. 1924).
" In re Ellis' Estate, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N. W. 1056 (1893) and cases in notes
following. See also Moor v. Moor, 63 S. W. 347 (Tex. Civ. App. i9oi) where
the decree in question was domestic.
" Ferry v. Troy Laundry, 238 Fed. 867 (D. Ore. 1917) ; Shrady v. Shrady,
47 Misc. 333, 95 N%Y. Supp. 991 (19o5) in which defendant wife did not appear.
'Loud v. Loud, 129 Mass. 14 (i88o) ; Chapman v. Chapman, 224 Mass. 427,
113 N. W. 359 (1916) in both of which subsequent acts of the parties were regarded as important.
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quired to accord such effect to the foreign decree. Andrews v.
Andrews 45 would seem to demonstrate that, but the common law
of most states does accord that effect to such a decree upon one
theory or another; in spite of the fact that the judgment is "void",
it is effective as between the parties. Some courts put these
decisions on the ground of estoppel ;49 others, arguing that there
is no "strict" estoppel or "estoppel in the ordinary sense", declare
the result to follow from the principle that one invoking the jurisdiction of a court will not be heard subsequently to deny the jurisdiction. 50
Thus, in Loud v. Loud,-1 where a husband who had been
married and domiciled in Massachusetts left his wife and obtained
a divorce in Maine, the wife appearing and the husband remarrying afterward, it was held that the wife could not subsequently
dispute the validity of the Maine decree in an action for divorce
based upon the cohabitation incident to the second marriage. Said
the court:
"The conclusive answer to this libel is, that the wife not
only appeared in the suit brought by the husband, but that she
afterwards executed a release, reciting the divorce therein
obtained by him, and for a pecuniary consideration discharging all her claims upon him or his estate. Having done this,
she cannot treat his subsequent marriage and cohabitation
with another woman as a violation of his marital obligation
to herself. The defence is allowed, not upon the ground of
strict estoppel, but because her conduct amounts to a connivance at, or acquiescence in, his subsequent marriage." 52
188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237 (19o2) holding that Massachusetts need
IS
not recognize for purposes of administration, the wife of a deceased who had
been divorced from his prior wife in a state in which neither party had been
domiciled, although both parties had appeared in that action. The doctrine of
estoppel and many of the cases here considered were urged upon the Supreme
Court by counsel. See abstract of briefs, 188 U. S. 14, 2o-21.

The doctrine was

urged in the state courts but expressly repudiated on the ground that the local
statute forbidding any effect to such decrees covered the case. See Andrews v.
Andrews, 176 Mass. 92, 95, 57 N. E. 333, 335 (1900).
Ferry v. Troy Laundry, supra note 46.
10Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 5o3, 66 N. E. 193 (1903) ; Cf. Re Swales'

Estates, 6o App. Div. 599, 7o N. Y. Supp.
1Supra note 47.
'Ibid. at i8.

220 (1901).
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If there were no doctrinal difficulties to prevent one from being
estopped to deny the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter, it would be difficult to find a stronger case of strict estoppel. There are the inconsistent positions of the wife; prejudicial
reliance by the husband in the pecuniary consideration and subsequent marriage; an innocent third party misled by the wife's
action; inducement as to both the husband and the innocent third
party. However, in other cases, where there has been no remarriage by either party, it may well be that a "strict" estoppel is not
present. In any event, the courts are uncertain as to the precise
grounds, although they usually refuse to permit the parties to deny
the validity of the divorce.
This has been held, even in favor of third persons. In
Bledsoe v. Seaman " the husband and wife were domiciled in
Kansas. The husband started a divorce action in South Dakota
to which the wife answered and obtained a decree on her cross
action. In a subsequent action in Kansas for the alienation of her
husband's affections, based on acts done after the foreign decree,
the South Dakota divorce was held a good defense. The court
was uncertain as to the appropriate doctrine, repeating the language used in previous cases:
"While the rule applied in this case does not rest upon
the doctrine of estoppel as that term is ordinarily understood,
yet there are some facts present which indicate that an ordinary estoppel might be applied. The plaintiff complains of
the defendant for having alienated the affections of her husband. Her right to recover for the acts complained of which
occurred before the divorce was granted, has been long since
barred by the statute of limitations. When the plaintiff procured the divorce, the defendant, having knowledge thereof,
had a right to assume that the plaintiff no longer had or
claimed any rights to the affections or society of her former
husband, and that any relations which she might assume with
him thereafter would not in any way infringe upon the rights
of the plaintiff."
5377

54

Kan. 679, 95 Pac. 576 (19o8).

51Ibid. at 687, 95 Pac. at 579.
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It is to be noted here that the wife had procured the divorce.
Qucere: would the result have been different had the husband
obtained it, the wife having appeared and having contested the
action in good faith?
Some courts, however, have declined to recognize the doctrine
in any form. They deny any effect whatever to a void decree,
either upon the ground of estoppel or the doctrine that one who
invokes the jurisdiction of the court cannot thereafter deny it.
This result has been reached both where the party who obtained
the divorce sought to repudiate it by filing another divorce action "
or in a collateral proceeding. 5 6 The result was given additional
support in one case by the theory that the party asserting the
estoppel was in no better position, so far as the fraud upon the
court was concerned, than the party sought to be estopped, and it
was thought that before a party could maintain a right by estoppel,
he must be in a position to assert that right.57 In other cases,
where no remarriage has taken place, the result is reached by a
failure to find the necessary elements of estoppel.58 These cases,
however, are in the minority, and in Massachusetts may be partly
explained by the local statute.
The general principle which complicates the doctrines in the
cases is the proposition that one is not estopped from denying the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action, even
though he has formerly taken an inconsistent position. 59 Where
Smith v. Smith, 13 Gray 209 (Mass. 1859).
' Hardy v. Smith, 136 Mass. 328 (1884). The Massachusetts statute is
supposed to require this result. See Holmes, C. J., in Andrews v. Andrews,
supra note 48. This may account for the apparent conflict in some of the Massachusetts cases. The Loud case, supra note 47, is supposed to be distinguishable
by the fact that it was an action for divorce based on the alleged adultery of
the second marriage, instead of an action for dower. See opinion of Holmes,
C. J., 176 Mass. 92, 95, 57 N. E. 333, 335.
' Hardy v. Smith, supra note 56, in which the parties were domiciled in
Massachusetts and the wife swore to and signed a petition, procured by collusion, and acknowledgment of service upon her husband, and prepared evidence
by deposition. These papers were forwarded to Utah where they were presented
to the court which rendered the decree. Neither party had ever lived in Utah.
The husband was permitted to claim a distributive share in the wife's property.
ISSee Todd v. Kerr, 42 Barb. 317 (N. Y. 1864), in which the court indulged
in considerable dubious language: "Besides every estoppel must be reciprocal
and binding on both parties. . . . And it is another principle of that law of
estoppel, that one who is not bound by it cannot claim the advantage of it."
0 Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission, 281 U. S. 470, 50 Sup. Ct. 374

(i93o).
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neither party is domiciled in the state in which the decree is rendered, there is a failure of jurisdiction over the subject matter and
it is a plausible argument that neither would ever be estopped from
subsequently attacking the decree. With this principle in view
some courts hold the parties bound upon a third theory, namely,
that since a divorce decree has two aspects, being both an adjudication of the status of the parties inter se, and also a determination of their legal status relative to the state, the decree may be
valid as to the one and void as to the other. The argument is
rather elaborately developed in some cases. Thus in In re Ellis'
Estate 60 it was said:
"It may seem anomalous that a judgment of divorce can
be so far effectual between the parties as to extinguish all
rights of property dependent on the marriage relation, without being effectual to protect them from accountability to the
state for their subsequent acts. One reason why they ought
not to be permitted, by going into another State and procuring
a divorce, to escape accountability to the laws of their State,
is that their act is a fraud upon the State, and an attempt to
evade its laws, to which it in no wise consents, and it may
therefore complain. But the parties do consent, and why
should they be heard to complain of the consequences to them
of what they have done?" 61
On the other hand, courts have refused to accord any effect
to such a decree for divorce, although it is conceded that divorce
does more than merely determine the "contractual" rights of the
parties. The Massachusetts court has said:
"If this were a mere private action, or suit in which the
personal rights of the parties alone were concerned, there
would be strong reason for applying the doctrine of estoppel,
to the act of the husband, in resisting the present motion of
the wife. But a suit for divorce is of a very different character; it is one in which the public have an interest, and in
the conduct and result of which the best interests of society
are concerned. . . . Marriage is undoubtedly a contract,
but it is a contract sanctioned by law, controlled by consideroSupra note 45.
Ibid. at 413, 56 N. W. at lO59.

6t
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ations of public policy vital to the order and harmony of
social life, and in its nature indissoluble, except by violations
of duty on the one part, to be taken advantage of in a special
manner, provided by law, on the other. Neither party can
do any act, by way of release, grant, stipulation or agreement,
to dissolve such contract; and yet by any of those acts one
could estop himself in a matter of private right." 6The theory of the former case, it is seen, circumvents this
difficulty by recognizing the validity of the foreign decree as to the
personal rights under the marriage contract, but declaring it void
as to the status of marriage where the interest of the state is
involved. If this is the rationale employed, the doctrine of estoppel is in no way involved. The foreign court had jurisdiction,
as to the contractual rights, as both parties were before it. Hence,
the decree is binding upon them by elementary principles of the
doctrine of res adjudicata. The result follows logically as soon
as it is conceded that the divorce decree need not necessarily be
void, so far as personal rights are concerned, merely because it is
impotent to determine status.
A similar, but more satisfactory theory is available by distingnishing between the status of matrimony itself, and the personal
rights incident thereto. When it is recognized that marriage, as
a status, involves various incidents which may be affected in many
ways other than by divorce, there appears little difficulty about the
present problem. The decree may effectually adjudicate the incidents of the status without being effectual to terminate it. There
is high authority for this doctrine:
"The interests involved in divore are of two kinds: the
interest of the State and the interest of each party in the
other. The States interested are the States in which the
parties are domiciled, and either should have power to grant
the divorce. But the interest of the defendant spouse in the
other should be divested only by a State which has jurisdiction over him or a State to which he has submitted his
interest." 63
Smith v. Smith, supra note 55, at 21o. The result in the Massachusetts
cases may be explained by the local statute (See supra notes 48, 56)..
"RESTATENIENT (tentative draft No. 2, 1926) § 1i8, special note III.
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It is upon this theory that it is urged that one spouse cannot
wrongfully acquire a new and separate domicile and procure a
valid divorce unless the court rendering the decree has jurisdiction
of the defendant's person. 64 It is true that here the divorce is
void in entirety, but this may well result from the impossibility of
terminating the status and at the same time preserving the incidents thereto in the absence of a statute."
It does not follow that
the incidents may not be abolished, but the status retained. In
fact this is not uncommon in the Conflict of Laws pertaining to
status. A status may be recognized as created by the proper personal law of the parties, although the incidents thereof are ignored
because of the current notion of justice or policy at the forum. 6
So, in our present problem, public policy may demand that the
status remain according to the proper personal law of the parties,
although the rights ordinarily incident thereto be effectually terminated by any court having jurisdiction of the parties.
In the discussion of ex parte divorces, the argument of the
American Law Institute proceeds in this manner:
"Two interests are involved in the granting of a divorce;
that of the state of the domicil in the existence of the status
and that of the defendant spouse in the plaintiff spouse.
Since the result of the action is to deprive the defendant
spouse of his interest in the other spouse, the court must in
some way acquire jurisdiction over that interest." 67
The doctrine now advanced is that a court obtains jurisdiction of
the respective interests of both spouses when they appear, and
having obtained jurisdiction over those interests, it may adjudicate
them, although it may not thus acquire jurisdiction over the status
and consequently adjudicate that.
There are analogies to support this result and its doctrinal
implications. A result much the converse occurs in the ordinary
action quasi in rem, upon attachment proceedings in an action
against a non-appearing, non-resident defendant after service by
'Ibid. comment (b).

'This is what happens under statutes preserving dower after divorce.
Polydore v. Prince, Fed. Cas. No. 11,257 (D. Me. 1837).
RESTATEMiENT,

§ 119,

comment (a).
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publication. The judgment is void as a personal judgment, but
valid as determining the rights of the parties in the res.Gs Better
still is the analogy when a court, with the parties before it, adjudicates their respective rights in foreign realty and decrees that one
party execute a conveyance to the other. The decree is recognized
by the situs of the res as an effectual adjudication as to the respective personal rights of the parties therein,"' although it does not
directly affect the res.
There is ample ground in the cases to make the application of
this doctrine plausible.
In In re Ellis' Estate 70 Chief Justice
Gilfilian observed that:
"A judgment operating on a res may be binding between the
parties to the action without binding one not a party, but
interested in the res. In an action for divorce the res upon
which the judgment operates is the status of the parties.
There are three parties interested in that,-the husband, the
wife, and the State of their residence." 7'
Later in the same case, he remarked that:
while the State cannot be bound by its resident citizens appearing in and consenting to the jurisdiction of a
court in another State in an action for divorce, the parties
may so bind themselves in respect to their individual interests." 72
If this theory is sound and such judgments are valid as personal judgments on the grounds that the court actually has jurisdiction of the parties, it follows that they are binding everywhere
and the Constitution of the United States will guarantee their full
faith and credit to such extent. The contrary, however, has been
held by the Supreme Court, although the present view was not
pressed or presented to the Court."
Still other theories, as yet unexploited, may be available for
these cases. Where both parties appear before a court in a state

I Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
ment (f).

Cf.

RESTATEMENT, §II9, com-

Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474 (1873).
¢'Supra note 45, at 411, 56 N. W. at 1O59.
Cf. Cooley, J., in People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247 (1872).
At 412, 56 N. W. at 1059.
n See Andrews v. Andrews, supra note 48.
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not the domicile of either, it may be argued that the decree of the
court, though ineffectual to terminate the marital status, nevertheless embodies the terms and conditions of a contract entered into
between the parties by which their personal rights are determined.
It might well be found that there is here a contract implied in fact,
to which both parties have assented. Such a contract, if expressed,
would be valid and enforceable everywhere ;74 and it is difficult to
see how it is the less valid because the assent is implied from submission to the court or from subsequent conduct. Consideration
is present, since the release from marital and property obligations
is mutual. Such grounds would satisfactorily solve the particular
problem presented by this class of cases.
Again, the foreign decree might be regarded as a "contract of
record" in itself, as to which there is some judicial recognition.5
It is not an illogical extension of the "debt of record", supporting
an action ex contractu, jurisdiction for which is present when the
parties are before the court."6
Where Defendant Does Not Appear
Where, however, the divorce is obtained in a state in which
neither party was domiciled and the absent defendant fails or
refuses to appear, such defendant is not ordinarily prevented from
subsequently denying the validity of the decree '7 unless he remarries 7s or is barred by an estoppel of record~i9 The person
" Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 45 N. E. 737 (1897) ; Winter v. Winter,
191 N. Y. 462, 84 N. E. 382 (19o8).
Cf. Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 6o7, 173 N. W. 127 (1gig).
Spilde v. Johnson, 132 Iowa 484, 1O9 N. W. 1023 (19o6). Contra: Berkson v. Cox, 73 Miss. 339, 18 So. 934 (1895).
' Sammons v. Pike, io8 Minn. 291, 122 N. W. 168 (io9) (husband procurred a divorce in Dakota which was the residence [domicile] of neither party.
Neither party remarried. On rehearing, the court called special attention to
the fact that the rights or status of no innocent third party were involved) ;
Field v. Field, 215 Ill. 496, 74 N. E. 443 (19o5) ; Beeman v. Kitzman, 124 Iowa
86, 99 N. W. 17 (1904).
' Bruguiere v. Bruguiere, 172 Cal. 199, 155 Pac. 988 (I916). In Appeal of
Richardson, 132 Pa. 292, 19 Atl. 82 (I88O), both parties had remarried.
"Hood v. Hood, iiO Mass. 463 (1872), where the husband procured a
decree in Illinois and the wife subsequently sued for divorce in Massachusetts

and still later for dower in the husband's Massachusetts land. In the dower
action the wife sought to impeach the Illinois decree on the ground that neither
party had been domiciled in Illinois at the time. It was held that the failure of
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obtaining the decree cannot attack it, however, even though he has
remarried.8 0 Mere lapse of time will not prevent the absent, nonappearing spouse from denying the validity of the divorce. In
one case where the husband had procured the divorce, the wife
successfully claimed her share in his property six years later, s '
while in another similar situation sixteen years had elapsed and
the husband had remarried.82 These cases are to be distinguished
from those where the divorce decree was obtained at the domicile
of both parties, but by reason of fraud is voidable. Under such
circumstances, delay of the one who has a right to avoid the decree
until some innocent third party is involved, may very well induce
a court of equity to refuse to exercise jurisdiction for laches. s3
It may seem illogical to prevent a non-appearing defendant in
a foreign divorce to deny the same when he or she has remarried,
but to allow such denial when the other spouse has remarried, as a
third person is injured quite as much in the one instance as in the
other. The spouse's situation, however, is distinctly different.
Where such spouse has remarried, it is a deliberate deception of
the third party, for such third party is induced thereby to assume
the validity of the foreign divorce. But where the spouse who is
at fault is allowed to defeat the absent, non-appearing spouse's
right to dispute the foreign decree by a hasty remarriage, it permits such spouse to accomplish by two wrongs what he could not
accomplish by the first one, and would obviously put a premium
upon his second marriage.
Some UnsatisfactoryCases
In Gould v. Gould 84 the doctrine that one who submits to the
jurisdiction of a court cannot later deny it, or the doctrine that a
the wife to obtain a divorce in her Massachusetts action was conclusive as to
the validity of the Illinois decree. It was not shown that the jurisdictional question was raised in the Massachusetts case, but it might have been, since the
husband pleaded his Illinois decree in defense. Cf. cases cited suprca note 31.
s'Re Swales' Estates; Starbuck v.Starbuck, both supraz note 50. Contr:
McCreary v. Davis, 44 S. C. 195, 22 S. E. 178 (i898).
tSammons v. Pike, supra note 77.
Field v. Field, supra note 77.
404, 72 N. W.
See Evans v. Woodsworth, 213 Ill.
N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923).

84235

1082

(1904).
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court having jurisdiction of the parties has jurisdiction to adjudicate their personal interests in each other and the personal rights
incident to the status of matrimony might well have been employed. As it stands, the case is authority for a very doubtful
proposition, and one that has no support whatever in authority or
doctrine. The parties were domiciled in New York; they both
appeared in a French court which rendered a decree in favor of
the husband, and later the wife sued for divorce in New York. It
was held that the French decree was binding. Although the opinion in the Court of Appeals is ambiguous, the Appellate Division
found that the French Court had jurisdiction to divorce the parties
because it was the place where they had lived for a number of
years as man and wife. Quoting from the opinion of the Appellate Division:
"While it is true that a man can have but one domicil, it does
not necessarily follow that the husband and wife may not
establish a matrimonial domicil different from that of the
husband." S5
This novel opinion seems to impute jurisdiction to divorce in the
state of the "matrimonial domicil" that is "different from that of
the husband." 16 As is shown, such reasoning is quite uncalled for
to rationalize the result.
In other cases, the doctrines herein developed might have
been employed to arrive at appropriate results, rather than reliance
upon clearly erroneous reasoning. In Monroe Co. Bank v.
Yeoman,8 7 it was held that a wife who had been domiciled in New
York and who had obtained a divorce in Ohio upon grounds not
recognized in New York, without personal service upon her husband, was barred from dower in his lands. The court apparently
regarded the marital relationship as terminated. This was, of
course, not true. Ohio, not being the domicile of either party,
could not render a valid decree. Had the wife the capacity and
had she actually obtained a separate domicile there, the decree
should be recognized by New York. In any event, under the New
820I App. Div. 670, 673, 194 N. Y. Supp. 745, 747 (1922).
But see the appraisal of the case in (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 88o.
97 119 Misc. 226, 195 N. Y. Supp. 531
(1922).
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York law, a divorce for reasons other than the wife's misconduct s8 will not bar her dower,8 9 except as to property acquired
after the divorce.90 Consequently, it has been argued that the
wife's action in procuring the Ohio divorce was such "misconduct" as to bar her dower.9 1 This is unsatisfactory for several reasons: in the first place, "misconduct" under this statute
means adultery only ;912 secondly, it obviously contemplates "misconduct" of the wife as grounds for a divorce procured by the
husband, and could not apply where the wife obtained the
decree; finally, the argument concedes that the divorce was valid
when it was not. And yet the case is quite correct in its result.
The statute expressly preserving dower upon divorce, in derogation
of the common law, 93 contemplates a valid divorce. In this case
there was none, yet she could not deny the jurisdiction of the
Ohio court to adjudicate her personal rights upon principles considered herein. Thus she could not claim dower as the widow of
her husband nor could she invoke a statute preserving dower to
spouses validly divorced. Accordingly, she had no basis upon
94
which to predicate a claim to a share in his property.
IN.

Y. ANN. CONS. LAWS (Cum. Supp. 1924) C. 5I, §§ 190, 196.
2o5 N. Y. 355, 98 N. E. 488 (1912).

'Van Blaricum v. Larson,

0 Starbuck v. Starbuck, supra note 50.
See (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 345.

See Van Cleaf v. Burns, 133 N. Y. 540, 30 N. E. 66i (1892). This was
recognized in (923) 36 HAuv. L. REV. 345.
1 At common law, a divorce terminates all dower interests. Barrett v.
Failing, III U. S. 523, 4 Sup. Ct. 598 (1884).
'In (1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 188 it is suggested that, the Ohio decree being
void, the wife's subsequent remarriage afforded her New York husband grounds,
recognized in New York, and such as to forfeit dower under the statute. The
note also suggests that the result obtained is contrary to that in the Van Blaricurn case, supra note 89, and the "quasi estoppel" theory repudiated therein.
This is not true, for in the Van Blaricum case, the New York court conceded
that the wife had been properly domiciled in the foreign state when she obtained
her divorce. This made the divorce valid everywhere, and the only question
was whether it cut off her dower under the New York statute.
Somewhat similar situations were presented in Brown v. O'Barn, 120 Misc.
550, i99 N. Y. Supp. 824 (923), and Sullivan v. Sullivan, 122 Misc. 104, 203
N. Y. Supp. 140 (1923). In the latter case, plaintiff had married defendant in
violation of a decree of divorce obtained by her former husband. After marriage with defendant, plaintiff had procured a divorce in Colorado for grounds
not recognized by New York law. It appeared, however, that she actually acquired a Colorado domicile. The court recognized the difficulty of denying plaintiff her bill for admeasurement of dower, but finally denied relief on the broad
doctrine of clean hands. In the former, the wife had left her New York husband and obtained a divorce in Indiana for cruel and inhuman treatment. There
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It might seem that one who marries a divorcee with knowledge that the divorce had been obtained in a state in which neither
of the spouses had been domiciled would likewise be barred from
subsequently questioning the decree. In Bell v. Little,"5 however,
plaintiff had abandoned her husband in New York and had gone
to Pennsylvania for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce. Bell,
with knowledge of these facts, went to Pennsylvania and married
plaintiff there. At his death plaintiff was denied dower in his
lands. The court insisted that plaintiff was still the wife of her
first husband against whom she had successfully defended a divorce action by reason of his misconduct. 96 The Appellate Division declared that she could not claim dower in his lands since
she had herself obtained the Pennsylvania decree.D9
It would
seem that, as between Bell and all claiming under him, and the
plaintiff, the plaintiff's rights in his property were secure although
both the Pennsylvania divorce and the subsequent marriage were
void. At common law, Bell would have been entitled to her property, at least as against everyone but her former husband, 9" and
Bell probably could not have annulled the marriage.9 9 Why
should he and his heirs be allowed to dispute the validity of the
marriage?' 0 0
was no personal service on the husband. She was allowed to share in her husband's lands. It may have been that the circumstances under which she left her
husband would entitle her to acquire a separate domicile for purposes of divorce.
See RESTATEMENT, §§ 29, 30, 119 and comments. Cruel and inhuman treatment
would entitle her to a limited divorce in New York, of which fact the court took
particular note. Apparently both cases are satisfactory. The Appellate Division,
however, reversed the Sullivan case, supra, on the grounds that the "clean hands"
maxim had nothing to do with the wife's claim for dower under the Van Blaricum decision. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2o9 App. Divw 910, 205 N. Y. Supp. 955
(1924).

"237 N. Y. 519, 143 N. E. 726 (1923).

'Kelsey v. Kelsey, 204 App. Div. II6, 197 N. Y. Supp. 371 (1923).
"Bell v. Little, 2o4 App. Div. 235, 237, 197 N. Y. Supp. 674, 677 (1922).
' Cropsey v. McKinney, 3o Barb. 47 (N. Y. 1859).
'Taylor v. Taylor, 63 App. Div. 231, 71 N. Y. Supp. 411 (190).
'Cf. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566

(1917), where plaintiff could not annul a marriage on the ground that defendant
had a living husband when he had induced her to go to Nevada and procure a
divorce on constructive service. It was conceded, however, that the wife acquired bona fide domicile in Nevada. Her first husband had abandoned her in
New York. The Court, however, puts the decision on the ground of estoppel
and unconscionable conduct by the plaintiff. The court thought that the full
faith and credit clause did not require recognition of the foreign decree even
though the wife were legally domiciled in the foreign state. This view, of
course, is rejected by modern scholars.

THE VALIDITY OF VOID DIVORCES

DIVORCE AT DoMIcILE OF ONE PARTY

Where the divorce is procured at the domicile of plaintiff
only, the problem of the effect of a "void" decree may be presented if the defendant is served only by publication and does not
personally appear, and the plaintiff's domicile was improper for
divorce purposes, as, for example, if it was acquired under circumstances that amount in fact to desertion of the defendant spouse.
In case of appearance, of course, the decree is valid for the court
has jurisdiction both of persons and subject matter.' 01 There is
no necessity for employing any exceptional grounds to support
such a decree, although the courts sometimes do so, apparently
under the impression that the decree is questionable under orthodox rules. 10 2
It is suggested in some of the cases 103 that there should be a
distinction between a voidable decree and one that is absolutely
void, the inference being that in case of the former there may be
the so-called estoppel which, for some reason, cannot be applied to
the latter case. Apparently the thought is that one may be
estopped from avoiding a decree, thus leaving it a valid record,
but where the decree is what is described as void for want of jurisdiction of party or subject matter this result cannot be obtained.
Again, it is thought that there is a difference between a decree
which is void for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter and a
decree by a court which wanted only jurisdiction of the defendant.
In the former case it is supposed to be impossible to estop the
parties or either of them, although quite possible to do so in the
latter situation. But if the decree is a voidable one,' 0 4 it cannot

11 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 5, 298, n. 37.

It is entitled to full faith and

credit. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. io8 (U. S. 1869).
'2 See Lacey v. Lacey, 38 Misc. 196, 77 N. Y. Supp. 235 (192) ; France v.
France, 79 App. Div. 291, 79 N. Y. Supp. 579 (I9O3) semble. It may be in the
France case that neither party was domiciled in North Dakota where the decree
was rendered.
103

See note 23 L. R. A. (N.

s.) 1254, 1255 (1910).

a0 The distinction is frequently obscured. In Elliot v. Wohlfrom, 55 Cal. 384
(i88o), a grantee of one who had obtained a divorce in Indiana sued in ejectment a grantee of the defendant in the divorce action. The defendant wife had
appeared by attorney, but the attorney was not authorized. The court thought
that the decree was voidable for fraud, but not void. But since the husband had
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be attacked collaterally at all. If the person originally entitled to
avoid it is barred, it is, by reason of some well established doctrine
of equity, such as laches, delay, pari delicto, etc., beyond avoidance,
and in any event, the attack could only be made directly. In
the case of a void decree, it may be suggested that it makes no
logical difference whether the decree is void by reason of a want
of jurisdiction over the parties or want of jurisdiction of the subject matter. 10 5 The entire doctrine of estoppel is a fiction and the
decree is quite as void in the one case as in the other. It is precisely this type of situation that demands some exceptional doctrine.
It is somewhat difficult in many cases to determine whether
the decree rendered at the alleged domicile of one party is void or
not. If the domicile were the matrimonial domicile or a separate
domicile acquired without fault in the plaintiff and under circumstances which would not constitute desertion, or by permission of
the other spouse, the decree is valid for all purposes and will be
recognized in other states. 10 6 If the domicile of the plaintiff is
a separate one, not acquired under the above circumstances, the
decree is, unless the defendant appears, 10 7 presumably void in the
state where it was rendered, and surely so elsewhere under the
procured the fraudulent decree, neither he nor his grantees could challenge it.
If the appearance by an unauthorized attorney rendered the decree voidable [Carpenter v. Oakland, 3o Cal. 44o (1866)] rather than void [Hess v. Cole, 23 N. J.
L. 116 (1851)], the reason for barring the husband and those claiming under
him is obviously that the matter is res judicataand binding upon all parties until
set aside, in a direct action by the wife. Until this is done, not even the wife
could collaterally dispute its validity.
' Cf. the rule of the federal courts that a litigant may "waive" the objections to jurisdicton of the federal courts on the grounds of diverse citizenship,
although the same is a "jurisdictional" fact, going to jurisdiction of the subject
matter. See Evers v. Watson, 156 U. S. 527, 533, IS Sup. Ct. 430, 432 (1895).
'0

RESTATEMENT, § 119.

In Nichols v. Nichols, 25 N. J. Eq. 6o (0874) the husband established
his domicile in Indiana, which was not the matrimonial domicile of the parties.
In a divorce action there, the wife appeared. It was held that she could not attack the decree in New Jersey four years later. The court seemed to attach
significance to the delay; see also Yorston v. Yorston, 32 N. J. Eq. 495 (188o).
Such reasoning is beside the point. If the husband was domiciled in Indiana
(which was not questioned) and if the wife appeared (which she did), the decree was valid to all purposes in all states until set aside.
'
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better view.' 08 Only in such cases is it necessary to resort to the
doctrines discussed here. 10 9
It is evident that this situation will arise only with respect to
the husband. The wife could not acquire a legal domicile apart
from him except under conditions which would render a divorce
in that state valid as against the husband whether he appeared or
not." 0 The husband, however, might obtain a domicile under
conditions which would not empower the courts of that state to
render a divorce, valid against a non-appearing non-resident wife.
Here the doctrine in question may be invoked as against the husband obtaining the decree;:" in such a situation, will the doctrine

'
'

See supra note 6.
In Gibson v. Gibson, 81 Misc. 5o8, 143 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1913), a wife, in

a suit for past maintenance allowed under a New York decree of separation,
was "estopped" by reason of a subsequent absolute divorce obtained by her in
another state on constructive service. Under the established rules governing a
wife's separate domicile (see RESTATEMENT, § 31) the foreign decree would be
valid and hence res judicata.
In Dow v. Blake, 148 III. 76, 35 N. E. 761 (1893), it was said that a husband was "estopped" from objecting to a decree obtained in another state by the
wife where he had conspired with her in the matter. Again, if the wife had had
a bona fide domicile in the foreign state, the decree was valid by reason of the
husband's permission to the wife to obtain a separate domicile. If the wife had
no domicile there, the decree was, of course, void, and an exceptional theory is
necessary to bar the husband from attacking it. Similarly in Guggenheim v.
Guggenheim, 135 App. Div. 914, 11g N. Y. Supp. 1127 (1911), aff'd in 201
N. Y. 602, 95 N. E. 1129 (1911), the wife suing in New York for divorce, was
barred by reason of a decree previously rendered in her favor in Illinois in an
action in which her husband appeared. If she had been actually domiciled in
Illinois, the decree would have been valid to all purposes and res judicata. In
Scheper v. Scheper, 125 S. C. 89, 118 S. E. 178 (1923), the court assumed that

the husband, after a limited divorce in North Carolina, had acquired a domicile
in Georgia and obtained a divorce there. He would, however, be estopped to
impeach it. Had he not been living apart from his wife by his own fault (as
determined by the North Carolina decree) the Georgia decree would have been
valid and no one could have impeached it collaterally. Cf. Parmelee v. Hutchins, infra note 112; Way v. Way, 132 S. C. 288, 128 S. E. 705 (1925) (this case
does not disclose whether the foreign decree was in fact invalid or valid). It
may be that in some of the cases the courts use the term "estoppel" to mean res
judicata.
no See RESTATEmENT, §§ 29, 30.
2 Cf. Scheper v. Scheper, supra note 1O9; People v. Chase, 27 Hun. 256
(N. Y. 1882), presented a peculiar situation and one in which the court might
have adopted the doctrine of these cases to excellent advantage. Defendant was
prosecuted for bigamy and successfully contended that he was not guilty, as
charged, because he was not "married" to either of the women named in the indictment. He was married to a third, a former wife from whom his "divorce"
rendered in his favor in a former state was invalid, being an ex parte proceeding
not recognized in New York.
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ever be applied against the wife? In Parmelee v. Hutchins 112 a
divorce was obtained by a husband in Illinois without personal
service on the wife and under conditions which made it invalid.
The Massachusetts wife, however, remarried on the strength of
the foreign decree. Having treated the divorce as valid, it was
held that she could not subsequently claim a widow's allowance on
the death of her former husband. Here the party against whom
the foreign decree was obtained was barred from disputing it.
The rights of innocent third parties may well account for the decision, and it is no doubt perfectly sound.
SUAMARY

i. Where the divorce is obtained at the domicile of both parties, it will usually be a valid decree, unless jurisdiction of the local
court failed for some reason to attach. If procured by fraud, the
party defrauded may avoid it in a direct action, providing the
petitioner satisfies the usual requirements of equity where one
seeks to vacate a judgment. If the one originally entitled to avoid
it remarries or waits an unreasonable time, the inconsistent conduct or laches may defeat the bill. The party guilty of the fraud
is concluded by the decree. Until set aside, it is res adjudicata.
No collateral attack can be made in another state except under
circumstances that would support such an attack in the state where
the decree was rendered.
2. Where the decree was rendered in a state that was, at the
time, the domicile of neither party, the divorce will not terminate
the marital relation, but will be effective to terminate and adjudicate the personal rights of the parties under the following circumstances: (a) where both parties appear; (b) where the nonappearing spouse consents to the decree, i. e. wheic it was procured
by collusion of the parties; (c) where although but one party
U-2238 Mass. 561, 131 N. E. 443 (1921).
Like the case of Scheper v.
Scheper, supra note iog, the husband acquired a domicile in the foreign state,
under circumstances which did not accord jurisdiction there for a valid divorce.
He was living apart from his wife by reason of his own fault, as judicially determined by the New York decree of separation. Hence the Illinois decree
was void, yet he was prevented from asserting its invalidity, and similarly
the wife, where she acquiesced in it for many years and remarried on the
strength thereof.
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appeared, such party subsequently seeks to repudiate the decree;
(d) where, although but one party appeared, the absent party subsequently remarries.
The rationalization that will support these results is as
follows:
In (a) the decree is valid and binding as to the personal rights
that are incident to the marital status because the court had jurisdiction of the parties which alone is sufficient to enable it to render
such a decree; or, it may be argued that since both parties appeared, the decree embodies the terms of a contract, implied in
fact from the action of the parties in appearing before the court
and in their subsequent conduct; or, it may be argued that, since
both appeared, the decree is a "contract of record", which is binding as to the personal and property rights of the parties thereto,
and subject to specific performance thereafter.
In (b) practically the same considerations are available to
support the decree between the parties. If either party remarries,
there are the rights of an innocent third party to be considered.
The party who remarries should not be allowed to question the
decree, as public policy forbids such unconscionable conduct. In
no event should the party who obtained the decree be permitted to
assail it.
In (c) there is a strong public policy in refusing to permit
one who obtains a decree in his favor, by a fraud upon the court,
subsequently to repudiate the decree regardless of whether there
has been a remarriage by either party. If there has been a remarriage there is the a fortioriargument.
In (d) remarriage by the non-appearing spouse is the only
sound ground for barring a collateral attack. Lapse of time, remarriage of the other spouse or any other conduct short of remarriage by the wronged party should be unavailing to work a quasiestoppel. However, where the party wronged by the decree has
availed himself thereof by remarriage, the decree must be regarded as final between the parties on grounds of public policy.
3. Where the decree was rendered at the domicile of the
plaintiff only, it will be valid if the party retaining or acquiring
the separate domicile was not guilty of desertion or if the defend-
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ant appears. If the acquisition of the domicile amounted to
desertion of defendant spouse, the divorce is void. Thus, only
the husband could obtain a void decree at what was his but not
his wife's domicile since under the present state of the law, the
wife could not acquire such a domicile. If he dies, those claiming
through him cannot impeach it, for public policy will not permit
them to set up the invalidity of a decree obtained by his own fraud
upon the courts and upon the wife, for the purpose of defeating
her rights. If the absent, non-appearing, innocent wife subsequently remarries, the court will protect her second husband by
barring her from impeaching the foreign divorce.

